What Service journalism Reveals About Religious and faith communities in a secular age

Here is the thing I keep coming back to on this. The topic of religious and faith communities in a secular age rewards more careful attention than the typical coverage provides, and the reason is not complicated once you know where to look.

What I find most interesting, and I think you will too, is faith communities providing social infrastructure that secular alternatives can’t replace. The practical read of the situation is also the more accurate one once you examine what the evidence actually shows.

The Journalism: Setting the Terms

The religiously unaffiliated now make up over 30 percent of US adults, up from 16 percent in 2007. This isn’t just a data point in the story of religious and faith communities in a secular age. It’s the structural condition that makes everything else in this analysis make sense. Context like this doesn’t age quickly. The conditions that produced it have been building for years, and this convergence is what makes the current moment different from previous moments that looked similar from a distance.

Faith communities provide social infrastructure that secular alternatives can’t replace.

Progressive religious spaces are growing as conservative denominations shrink. Religion News Service has been tracking this consistently.

What makes this moment worth examining carefully isn’t the novelty but the confirmation. The underlying dynamics have been visible for some time. What’s new is that they’ve reached a threshold where ignoring them requires active effort rather than simple inattention. That threshold crossing is the event, not the underlying movement that produced it.

And online church communities formed during COVID are retaining 40 percent of attendance as part of that same picture. These elements don’t exist in separate silos. They’re reinforcing conditions in the same structural shift.

The Resource Map: The Analysis

Online church communities formed during COVID retaining 40 percent of attendance is where the analysis gets more specific. The surface reading is accessible and not wrong, but it misses the mechanism. The mechanism is where the practical insight lives. What I find most interesting, and I think you will too, is that the mechanism is interfaith coalitions leading on housing, immigration, and anti-poverty work. Understanding it changes what you do with the information.

The “spiritual but not religious” category is the largest growing self-identification.

The skeptical counterargument deserves honest engagement: prior moments with similar surface characteristics didn’t produce the outcomes that seemed logical at the time. That history is real. What’s different now is that “spiritual but not religious” is the largest growing self-identification, which isn’t a minor variable. It’s the infrastructure condition that previous cycles lacked. Infrastructure changes tend to persist in ways that sentiment-driven changes don’t. Pew Research religion data is one source tracking this with the rigor it requires.

There’s also a distributional question that often goes unaddressed in coverage of religious and faith communities in a secular age: who captures the value created by these shifts, and who absorbs the disruption costs? The aggregate picture can be positive while the distribution is uneven in ways that matter enormously to specific participants. Keeping that distributional lens in view is part of reading the situation clearly rather than simply optimistically.

Implications: What This Means If You Care About Local Services

The implications extend beyond the immediate context. The religiously unaffiliated now making up over 30 percent of US adults, up from 16 percent in 2007, combined with the structural conditions described above creates a situation where adjacent fields, decisions, and communities are affected in ways that aren’t always visible from inside the primary story. The second-order effects are frequently more important than the first-order ones, and they’re where careful attention pays the highest returns.

Think about the warmth of a town hall that actually works.

The practical question isn’t whether to engage with these dynamics but how. The answer depends on context, on what role you occupy relative to religious and faith communities in a secular age and what your actual decision horizon is. But the first step is the same regardless: accurate understanding of what’s actually happening rather than what the most available narrative says is happening.

A few concrete observations are worth separating out from the broader analysis. First: faith communities providing social infrastructure that secular alternatives can’t replace isn’t a temporary condition. It’s a new baseline. Second: interfaith coalitions leading on housing, immigration, and anti-poverty work suggests that the adjustment period isn’t over. Third, and most important: the organizations and individuals who are treating the current moment as a new steady state rather than a transition are making a categorization error that will be costly to unwind later.

The Case Against: What the Critics Get Right

Intellectual honesty requires acknowledging the strongest counterarguments, not just the weakest ones. The case against the optimistic reading of religious and faith communities in a secular age isn’t trivial. There are structural vulnerabilities in the current picture that deserve direct engagement rather than dismissal.

The most serious objection is about sustainability. Progressive religious spaces growing as conservative denominations shrink can be read not as a foundation but as a ceiling, a point beyond which growth becomes self-limiting because of the very dynamics that produced it. If the current state has already incorporated most of the available supply of early-adopting participants, the remaining growth curve may be structurally shallower than the recent trajectory implies.

“Spiritual but not religious” is the largest growing self-identification.

Looking Forward

The trajectory here is clearer than the pace. Making predictions about when specific thresholds will be crossed is genuinely difficult, and anyone claiming precision about timelines should be treated with skepticism. But the direction, toward the religiously unaffiliated making up an even larger percentage and continued development of the conditions described above, is supported by the evidence in a way that doesn’t depend on a single variable going right.

“Spiritual but not religious” as the largest growing self-identification is the variable to watch as the leading indicator. Historical patterns suggest it moves first, with broader metrics following with some lag. This doesn’t make the outcome certain, but it makes it readable. And readability is what you need for good decisions.

Three questions are worth holding as the story develops. First: are the structural conditions that enabled the current state durable, or are they cyclical? Second: who is positioned to benefit from the next phase, and does that differ materially from who benefited in the current phase? Third: what would a clean falsification of the optimistic thesis look like, and is there any evidence of that signal emerging? These questions don’t need answers today, but having asked them changes what you notice in the months ahead.

That’s my read. I want to hear yours.

What’s missing from this list, or what has changed? Keep it updated in the comments.